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This paper studies accounting choice in 76 NYSE firms with persistent losses and dividend 
reductions (40% forced by binding covenants). We find that managers’ accounting choices primarily 
reflect their firms’ financial difficulties, rather than attempts to inflate income. Firms with and 
without binding covenants exhibit minor accrual differences in the ten years before the dividend 
reduction. In the dividend reduction and following three years, the full sample exhibits large negative 
accruals that likely reflect the fact that 87% of sample firms engage in contractual renegotia- 
tions with lenders, unions, government, and/or management that provide incentives to reduce 
earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates accounting choice in 76 financially troubled New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms. A number of papers study accounting 
choice in samples that likely contain a subset of troubled companies ~ see, for 
example, Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) 
on union negotiations, DeAngelo (1988) on proxy contests, Moyer (1990) on 
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troubled banks, Healy and Palepu (1990) on firms close to violating debt 
constraints, Sweeney (1991) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) on firms in 
default, Pourciau (1993) on nonroutine management changes, Jones (1991) on 
firms seeking government import relief, and Petroni (1992) on troubled insur- 
ance companies. The results of these studies are mixed. Liberty and Zimmerman 
and Healy and Palepu find no evidence of earnings management. DeAngelo, 
Petroni, Moyer, and Sweeney find that managers’ accounting choices are 
systematically income-increasing in their samples. DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
Pourciau, and Jones find that managers’ accounting choices are income-de- 
creasing. DeFond and Jiambalvo’s results are mixed. 
Our sample consists of 76 NYSE firms that reported at least three annual 
losses in the six-year period 1980-1985 and that reduced cash dividends. For 
troubled firms, i.e., those with persistent earnings problems, extant theories 
predict that managers’ accounting choices will be systematically income-increas- 
ing. First, managers have incentives to increase reported earnings in attempts 
to keep their jobs and reduce intervention by the firm’s board of directors 
and/or regulatory agencies [DeAngelo (1988) Weisbach (1988), Moyer (1990) 
Petroni (1992) Pourciau (1993)]. Additionally, managers of the subset of 
troubled firms that are close to a debt covenant violation have incentives to take 
income-increasing actions to avoid or defer the costs of a breach [Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) Healy and Palepu (1990) Sweeney (1991), DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994)]. 
We selected firms whose financial problems were more than transitory’ to 
minimize the chance that managers faced conflicting accounting incentives. 
Managers of firms whose earnings temporarily fall below the amount necessary 
to earn a bonus have incentives to underreport income [Healy (1985)].’ In 
contrast, managers who expect poor earnings to persist face an immediate threat 
of job loss [Weisbach (1988) Gilson (1989), Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993)]. This 
threat, combined with the low probability of earning a profit in the near term, 
suggests that job preservation, and not the hope of a future bonus, is managers’ 
main concern in troubled firms. Since every sample firm reduced dividends, 
managers most likely viewed their firms’ earnings problems as persistent 
[Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968), Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992)]. 
Our sample enables us to assess the importance of both debt covenants and 
financial distress in general as determinants of managers’ accounting choices, 
‘But not terminal, since the vast majority recovered from their financial difficulties; only three 
firms had filed for bankruptcy protection within two years after the dividend reduction. Our sample 
contains numerous large, well-known firms (such as Allis-Chalmers, Bethlehem Steel, Caterpillar, 
Ford, and United Airlines) that continue to operate as of this writing. 
‘Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) find that troubled firms reduce reliance on accounting-based 
compensation schemes and that the majority do not pay bonuses. 
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since it consists of 29 troubled firms that initially reduced cash dividends when 
debt constraints were binding, and 47 troubled firms that reduced dividends 
without binding debt covenants. The latter firms, although clearly experiencing 
earnings problems, are typically a substantial distance away from a covenant- 
forced dividend reduction at the time managers cut dividends: the mean firm has 
ten and one-half years of unrestricted retained earnings available for dividends 
at the current payout level (median, 5.1 years). Thus, the latter firms provide 
a useful control sample to assess whether the accounting choices of firms with 
binding covenants differ from those of troubled firms without such constraints. 
Our evidence indicates that managers’ accounting choices primarily reflect 
acknowledgment of their firms’ financial troubles, rather than attempts to 
mitigate covenant violations or to portray the firm as less troubled. For 
example, we find that troubled firms have persistently large negative accruals. In 
the dividend reduction year (year 0), mean and median accruals are - 19.9% 
and - 18.3% of pre-loss stockholders’ equity - almost twice as negative as the 
largest corresponding figures in the ten prior years. Accruals remain reliably 
negative when we control for sales and cash flow performance, which is unusu- 
ally poor in the dividend reduction and subsequent years. While year 0 accruals 
are somewhat more negative for firms with binding covenants, firms with and 
without binding covenants have very large negative accruals in each year 0 to 3. 
In years before the dividend reduction, firms with binding covenants should 
have higher accruals (than control firms) because their managers have stronger 
incentives to inflate earnings to defer or avoid a mandatory dividend reduction.3 
Since it is difficult to predict exactly when such higher accruals should occur, we 
provide evidence on cross-sectional accrual differences for ten years before the 
dividend reduction. In years - 10 to - 1, only one year (year - 3) shows an 
accrual difference that is in the predicted direction and is (marginally) signifi- 
cant. We also find that private debt is responsible for virtually all (25 of 29) 
binding covenants in our sample, although many firms have public debt as well. 
This finding supports the view that private debt covenants are typically set 
tighter than public debt covenants [Watts and Zimmerman (1986)]. 
We explore possible sources of the negative abnormal accruals in the dividend 
reduction year, and find a substantial portion is due to an abnormal inventory 
decline. This decline more plausibly reflects a change in managers’ real economic 
decisions in response to financial trouble rather than earnings management. 
However, we also find evidence of income-decreasing accounting choices insofar 
as a majority of sample firms takes noncash writeoffs in the dividend reduction 
year that are reasonably attributable to managers’ accounting discretion. For all 
40 firms with such writeoffs, the median writeoff is one half beginning-of-period 
%weeney (1991) makes an analogous prediction: managers of firms that default on their debt 
obligations have greater incentives to switch to more liberal accounting procedures in the five years 
before default than do managers of similar firms that do not default. 
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unrestricted retained earnings (the mean has much greater impact). For firms 
with binding covenants, mean and median writeoffs are sufficiently large to 
eliminate retained earnings available for dividends. 
We investigate potential reasons why managers of troubled companies would 
deliberately reduce reported earnings. One possibility (on which we can provide 
no evidence) is that auditors force them to take noncash writeoffs. We do find, 
however, that 87% of sample firms engaged in contractual renegotiations - with 
lenders, unions, government, and/or management - that provide incentives to 
reduce reported earnings, and this incidence is unusually high for our sample. 
Managers’ willingness to take writeoffs and reduce dividends can help convince 
lenders that managers are serious about streamlining operations. Losses and 
dividend reductions can help convince unions to accept wage concessions 
[Liberty and Zimmerman (1986), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991)] or the 
government to grant import relief [Jones (1991)]. An earnings ‘bath’ can help 
justify a management change [Moore (1973), DeAngelo (1988), Pourciau (1993)] 
or rationalize dividend cuts to stockholders who suspect managers of over- 
retaining cash [Jensen (1986)]. 
Although sample firms exhibit large negative accruals, sampling on the basis 
of losses likely selects firms whose average accruals are lower than those of 
troubled firms in general. Consequently, care must be exercised in generalizing 
our findings to troubled companies without persistent losses and dividend 
reductions. This selection bias is discussed in section 2, which also details sample 
selection procedures. Section 3 describes the accruals of the binding, control, 
and full samples and presents several models of abnormal accruals in the 
dividend reduction and subsequent years, all of which indicate accruals are 
reliably negative. Section 4 takes a closer look at the dividend reduction year, 
particularly at noncash writeoffs. Sections 5 and 6 provide evidence on several 
nonmutually exclusive explanations why managers of troubled firms might 
deliberately reduce reported income. Section 7 summarizes the paper. 
2. Sample selection procedures and selection bias issues 
As in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) we select all nonfinancial NYSE firms 
on the 1986 Compustat Primary and Research Tapes with at least three years of 
negative net income or negative pre-tax operating income during the six-year 
period 1980-1985, and that are initially healthy in that they have positive 
income and pay cash dividends the year before the initial annual loss during 
1980-1985.4 We also require complete per-share dividend data on Compustat 
4We define(i) negative net income as a value less than zero for Compustat Item 18, income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, plus Item 48, extraordinary items plus discontinu- 
ed operations, and (ii) negative pre-tax operating income as a value less than zero for Compustat 
Item 13, operating income before depreciation, minus Item 14, depreciation expense. 
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for the ten years preceding the first loss during 1980-1985. This sampling 
procedure yields 80 NYSE firms with three or more annual losses during 
1980-1985 [see DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) for additional descriptive data 
on these firms]. 
Our final sample consists of 76 dividend-reducing NYSE firms that reported 
multiple losses during 198&1985.5 From the initial sample of 80 firms, we drop 
(i) two firms that did not reduce dividends around the time the firm began 
reporting losses (since the absence of a dividend reduction may indicate that 
managers viewed these firms’ difficulties as transitory) and (ii) two firms that 
changed fiscal year ends around the time of the dividend reduction (because 
their accounting numbers are difficult to interpret). For firms with multiple 
dividend reductions, we focus on the initial reduction as a time when managers 
came to view their firms’ earnings difficulties as more than temporary. 
For the vast majority of our sample, the dividend reduction year on which we 
focus our analysis occurs early in the firm’s loss period. Sixty-one (80.3%) of 76 
firms announced the dividend reduction before or concurrent with announce- 
ment of their first annual loss during 1980-1985. [Of these, five announced the 
reduction before the first loss year, 49 announced it during that year, and seven 
before or with announcement of the initial loss.] Another ten firms reduced 
dividends after reporting one annual loss, while the remaining five firms reduced 
dividends after two or three annual losses. The financial troubles experienced by 
most sample firms, while persisting for three or more years, were not generally 
‘terminal’, since only three firms (3.9%) had filed for bankruptcy protection 
within two years after the dividend reduction on which we focus here. 
2.1. Selection bias issues 
Because we sample for firms with reported losses, our sample is characterized 
by a selection bias that limits the generality of our inferences. Specifically, since 
earnings equal accruals plus operating cash flow, firms with net losses will tend 
mechanically to be firms with low accruals, independent of managers’ ac- 
counting choices. [Low accrual realizations will tend to map into low earnings 
realizations which, in turn, increase the probability a given firm will enter our 
sample.] Thus, relative to troubled firms in general, our sample likely contains 
a larger proportion of firms with unusually low accruals. Consequently, the 
large negative accruals documented below likely represent a downward-biased 
estimate of the accruals that would characterize a broader population of 
troubled firms (not limited to firms with reported losses). 
‘Most sample firms experienced both net (bottom line) losses and operating losses. For example, 
there are only four firms without an operating loss during 1980-1985 and zero firms without a net 
loss during this period. 
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Another difficulty with our sampling algorithm is that the accruals of troubled 
firms are likely to be abnormally low due to (i) exogenous factors, i.e., due to 
firms’ troubled circumstances in general, and to (ii) managers’ real (as opposed 
to accounting) decisions undertaken in response to that trouble. For example, 
low accruals might indicate that managers are liquidating working capital to 
conserve cash in response to an unanticipated decline in the demand for their 
products - a decision more plausibly viewed as a real economic choice. In 
response to (i), we control for cash flow and sales performance in calculating 
abnormal accruals in an attempt to remove the effect of exogenous factors 
beyond managerial control. To address (ii), we analyze various accrual compo- 
nents in an attempt to more reliably assess whether the abnormal accruals we 
observe likely reflect managers’ accounting choices or their real economic 
decisions. 
Finally, because our sample period includes the early 1980s recession, man- 
agers of our firms are more likely (than during randomly selected periods) to 
make income-decreasing accounting decisions because they can blame the 
resultant adverse earnings on the general economy rather than their own policies. 
2.2. Binding and control samples 
Sweeney (1991) tests the hypothesis that firms that default on their debt 
obligations change to more liberal accounting procedures in the five years 
before default (more frequently than do comparable firms that do not default). 
We test a variant of this prediction: firms that reduce dividends in the face of 
binding debt covenants have differentially larger accruals in years prior to the 
dividend reduction (than do comparable firms that reduce dividends absent 
binding covenants). Of course, firms that successfully avoid a retained earnings- 
based covenant may do so because prior accounting choices had especially 
strong income-increasing effects. If so, Sweeney’s and our predictions would be 
reversed. In either case, we expect differential accrual behavior for firms with 
and without binding covenants in periods prior to the violation, to the extent 
that covenant violations provide economically material incentives to manage 
earnings. 
Our 76 sample firms represent two groups: (1) the binding sample of 29 firms 
that reduced dividends in the face of binding debt covenants and (2) the control 
sample of 47 firms whose year 0 dividend reductions were not forced by binding 
debt covenants. As in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) we use annual report 
disclosures to classify a dividend reduction as forced by binding covenants6 if 
6Although we use the term ‘forced’ dividend reduction, readers should note that the force comes 
via an income-dependent debt constraint. To the extent that income is itself partially endogenous (as 
we argue in this paper), a covenant-forced dividend reduction is itself somewhat discretionary to 
managers. 
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(i) end-of-period unrestricted retained earnings (URE) are zero, or (ii) the annual 
report states the firm is unable to pay dividends due to binding covenants, or (iii) 
URE plus cash dividends paid in the current year are strictly less than cash 
dividends paid in the immediately prior year. 
The typical firm in the control sample, while clearly experiencing financial 
difficulties, is ‘far’ from a debt covenant violation in the dividend reduction year. 
We calculate a dividend coverage ratio as year-end unrestricted retained earn- 
ings plus any common stock dividends paid during the dividend reduction year, 
divided by common dividends paid during the prior year [see DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990) and Healy and Palepu (1990) for elaboration]. As discussed in 
Healy and Palepu, this number can be roughly interpreted as the number of 
years a firm can continue to pay last year’s dividend out of available retained 
earnings. For the 47 firms in the control sample, the average dividend coverage 
ratio is 10.5 years (median, 5.1 years) in the dividend reduction year. 
To the extent that we have misclassified firms, the power of our tests is 
reduced. Misclassification is likely to be a problem for firms in the control 
sample that are ‘close’ to a covenant violation in the dividend reduction year. 
Nine of the 47 control firms had a dividend coverage ratio less than two in that 
year [Healy and Palepu’s (1990) criterion for close to a violation]. Ten of the 47 
control firms had dividend reductions in subsequent years that were forced by 
binding covenants. The union of the two groups is 14 firms, hence as many as 
29.8% of the 47 control firms may have reduced year 0 dividends to avoidfuture 
binding covenants, In response, we re-ran all tests (i) deleting the 14 firms from 
the control group and (ii) deleting the 14 firms from the control group and 
adding them to the binding group, and the results do not change in any material 
way from those reported in tables 1 and 2 below. 
For an ideal test of the debt covenant hypothesis, our control and binding 
samples would differ only in the extent to which their debt covenants are 
binding. In other words, we would like the control sample to contain firms 
whose financial difficulties and other relevant attributes (e.g., size, leverage, 
industry, and calendar year of the dividend reduction) are essentially the same. 
As it turns out, however, firms in the binding sample are smaller and somewhat 
more highly levered than control firms.’ 
Although the combined sample of 76 firms exhibits time clustering of dividend 
reductions, there is no apparent difference across the binding and control 
samples. Of the 76 dividend reductions in the combined sample, 36 occurred in 
1982, a major recession year. The 47.4% incidence of dividend reductions in 
1982 is over twice as high as the 21.1% incidence in 1981 and the 18.4% 
‘The median binding sample firm has a $71 million year 0 market value of equity (book value, $79 
million), versus $178 million (book value, $232 million) for control firms (difference significant at the 
0.02 level). In total assets and sales, binding sample firms are smaller, but not generally reliably so. 
There are no material differences in long-term debt to total assets, although the binding sample 
sometimes has a reliably higher total debt to total assets ratio. 
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incidence in 1980. The incidence of dividend reductions in our sample is large 
relative to that for public firms, both for 1982 and for 1980-1985.* 
Although the combined sample exhibits industry clustering, there is again no 
apparent difference across the binding and control samples. Of the 76 firms in 
the combined sample, 31 are in eight four-digit SIC codes. There are eight firms 
in 33 10, blast furnaces and steel works; five in 3330, smelting/refining of nonfer- 
rous metals; four in 1040, gold and silver ores; four in 3540, metal-working 
machinery and equipment; four in 4511, air transport; three in 1211, bituminous 
coal and lignite; and three in 3241, cement, hydraulic. The remaining 45 firms 
are in 37 different industries. Membership in a troubled industry (and economy) 
can help managers rationalize low earnings and dividend reductions as due to 
events beyond their control rather than to their own poor performance.9 
2.3. Earnings and cash frow performance 
Table 1 reports mean and median earnings and operating cash flow” for the 
binding, control, and combined samples in years - 10 through +3 relative to 
the dividend reduction, and significance levels for t- and Wilcoxon tests of 
differences across the binding and control samples. All variables (earnings, cash 
flow, and subsequently reported accruals) are standardized by beginning-of- 
period book value of stockholders’ equity in each year from - 10 through the 
year before the firm’s first loss during 1980-1985. For all subsequent years, they 
are standardized by stockholders’ equity the year before the first loss (to avoid 
artificially inflating the variables as stockholders’ equity is decreased by losses 
over time). We repeat all tests deflating by sales, with virtually no differences in 
our inferences (the few minor differences are discussed below). 
Consistent with our sampling criteria, table 1 shows a large decline in year 
0 earnings for the sample of 76 firms, with mean and median earnings negative 
through year 3. Cash flow falls dramatically in year 0, but recovers to its 
pre-dividend cut level in year 3. Mean and median cash flow in years 0, 1, and 
2 are about half their levels in the prior ten years, with the year 0 cash flow 
decline significant at the 0.027 level under a t-test and at the 0.011 level under 
a Wilcoxon test (not reported in table 1). Although mean and median earnings 
‘For 8,500 publicly held stocks, Moody’s Diuidend Record reports an average incidence of 
dividend reductions of 4.3% per year over 1980-1985, with yearly rates ranging from 2.9% in 1980 
to 7.5% in 1982. 
‘DeAngel and DeAngelo (1990, table III) report that, after earnings problems, weak product 
markets and a general economic downturn are the most common reasons managers cite for dividend 
reductions. 
“Cash flow is measured as Compustat Item 110, funds from operations, minus the change in Item 
2, accounts receivable, minus the change in Item 3, inventories, minus the change in Item 68, other 
current assets, plus the change in Item 70, accounts payable, plus the change in Item 71, taxes 
payable, plus the change in Item 72, other current liabilities. 
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are negative for the full sample in each year 0 to 3, mean and median cash flows 
are positive in each of those years. A possible explanation is that sample firms 
are liquidating working capital because of a decline in demand. 
The earnings of binding and control firms are similar in years - 10 through 
-2. In year - 1, the binding sample’s mean (median) earnings of - 1.0% 
(2.5%) of stockholders’ equity are reliably lower than the 9.3% (8.2%) for 
control firms at the 0.02 (0.01) level, but the mean difference is insignificant 
under the sales deflator. This difference reflects the fact that firms in the binding 
sample reduce dividends a bit later relative to their first loss than do control 
firms.” There is some indication that binding sample firms have lower earnings 
in year 0 as well, although this difference disappears when we deflate by sales. 
Beyond year 0, there is little indication of earnings differences across the 
samples. There is no material operating cash flow difference in almost all of the 
ten years before through three years after the dividend reduction. 
Overall, earnings and cash flow performance are remarkably similar across 
the binding and control samples in years - 10 to + 3. The notable exception is 
year - 1 (and arguably year 0) in which earnings of the binding sample are 
lower than those of control firms. This finding suggests that firms that reduce 
dividends in the face of binding covenants exhibit earlier and deeper earnings 
problems than do firms that reduce dividends absent such constraints. Also, 
sample firms with binding covenants are smaller and somewhat more highly 
levered than firms whose dividend reductions are voluntary. Otherwise, our 
binding and control samples exhibit no material differences in earnings or cash 
flow, industry affiliation, or in calendar year of the dividend reduction. 
3. Accrual analysis: Binding, control, and combined samples 
Managers of firms whose year 0 dividend reductions were forced by binding 
debt covenants have incentives to differentially inflate earnings in prior years in 
attempts to defer or avoid the mandatory reduction. A significant problem in 
testing this prediction is that it is difficult to know in which particular year(s) 
such earnings management will occur. One approach [similar to that adopted 
by Sweeney (1991) to study accounting procedure choice prior to default] is to 
examine a time-series of annual accruals that extends sufficiently far back to 
capture the effect of all covenant-related attempts to inflate earnings. A short- 
coming of this approach is that it may fail to detect earnings management 
because different subsets of firms manipulate income in different years. Nonethe- 
less, this approach seems the most reasonable, at least until researchers can 
“The average binding sample firm reduced dividends in the first quarter after the initial loss 
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more precisely pinpoint the time when managers have both strong incentives 
and opportunities to inflate income to mitigate covenant violations. 
We first present accrual levels and changes. Accruals are calculated from 
Compustat data as net income minus operating cash flow, as defined in Bowen, 
Burgstahler, and Daley (1986) ~ see footnote 10 for details. The advantage of this 
cash flow definition is that it adjusts for all major working capital items. Because 
our firms’ cash flow deteriorates markedly in year 0, we next analyze accrual 
prediction errors that adjust for the contemporaneous cash flow and sales 
decline. This approach attempts to control for ‘nondiscretionary’ accruals, 
i.e., the portion of total accruals that is currently beyond managerial control 
[DeAngelo (1986)]. 
Managers likely alter their real, as well as their accounting decisions in 
response to financial distress, and such alterations can also impact the behavior 
of accruals. Thus we analyze not only abnormal accruals and accrual prediction 
errors, but also the components of accruals, e.g., working capital accruals, 
depreciation + deferred income taxes, and the accruals that remain after the first 
two components are removed. Our accrual components analysis focuses on 
noncash writeoffs that are not associated with any transaction (hence whose 
timing is more likely to reflect managers’ accounting discretion). 
Table 2 reports accrual levels and changes for the binding and control 
samples for years - 10 through + 3, and p-values for tests of differences across 
the samples. Over years - 10 to - 6, the year - 9 accrual changes are signifi- 
cantly different (under the parametric test only, and the sign is opposite to that 
predicted). Over years - 5 to - 1, there is no significant difference in four years, 
and at most a marginally significant difference in year -3. Since random 
variation could easily generate a marginally significant difference in one of five 
years, these data seem most consistent with the view that there is little difference 
in the accruals of the two samples in years before the dividend reduction. 
In subsequent years, there are at most relatively minor differences in accrual 
levels and changes across the two samples. In terms of point estimates, mean and 
median accrual levels are more negative for binding firms in years 0 through 3, 
but the differences are not statistically significant. The strongest indication of 
a difference comes in year 0 when the -23.5% median accrual for the binding 
sample is reliably more negative (at the 0.02 level) than the - 12.6% median 
accrual for the control sample (parametric p-value = 0.35). 
Our finding of at best minor accrual differences across binding and control 
samples suggests that financial trouble broadly construed (rather than a cove- 
nant violation per se) is the primary determinant of these firms’ accruals. This in- 
terpretation is supported by table 3, which reports year-by-year accrual levels and 
changes for the full sample. The table shows that, in year 0, mean and median 
accruals are - 19.9% and - 18.3% of stockholders’ equity, numbers that are 
almost twice as negative as the largest corresponding figure in all ten prior years. 
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In year 0, the -8.3% mean accrual change is significant at the 0.10 level, 
while the -7.5% median change is significant at the 0.01 level. These figures 
probably understate the true extent to which the year 0 accrual is abnormally 
negative, since there is evidence that the accrual decline began in year - 1. 
Hence we next estimate the normal accrual in year 0 as its level two years before 
the firm’s initial 10~s.‘~ The abnormal accrual equals the year 0 accrual minus its 
estimated normal value, all deflated by stockholders’ equity in the year of the 
normal accrual. This procedure is also a sensible check on accrual changes, 
given Dechow’s (1992) finding that accruals exhibit mean reversion in her 
sample. Under this procedure, the year 0 mean abnormal accrual is - 14.8% 
and the median is - 1 l.O%, both significant at the 0.01 level. 
For years 1, 2, and 3, table 3 reports respective mean abnormal accruals 
of - 14.9%, - 15.7%, and -21.2%, and median values of - 15.0%, -9.8%, 
and - 13.0%, with all values different from zero at the 0.01 level. The fact that 
we observe persistently large negative accruals suggests that such accruals are 
related to sample firms’ ongoing difficulties, and are not simply characteristic of 
a single year in which they reduce dividends or have binding covenants. 
Inferences drawn under this procedure provide an important check on those 
drawn from year-to-year accrual changes, since accrual changes underestimate 
abnormal accruals for firms whose immediately prior period accruals have fallen 
to an abnormally low level. 
Since the typical sample firm had a material cash flow decline in year 0 (table 
l), the negative abnormal accruals reported in table 3 might primarily reflect an 
exogenous decline in real economic performance. To control for such a decline, 
we analyze accrual levels in years 0 through 3 relative to those predicted by 
models that link the normal accrual level to the contemporaneous level of cash 
flow or sales, which are taken as proxy measures of exogenous performance.13 
We emphasize results using sales as the measure of exogenous performance since 
selection bias issues (see section 2) suggest that cash flow is a less-than-perfect 
measure of exogenous performance for our sample.14 
Table 4 reports accrual prediction errors for years O-3 from regression models 
that relate accruals to cash flow or sales. For each firm, we estimate coefficients 
“The initial loss year and the dividend reduction year are the same for 49 sample firms. Five firms 
reduced dividends before the initial loss year, while 22 reduced them after that year. 
r3Neither sales nor cash flow is likely to be totally exogenous. For example, sales reflect 
managerial decisions to accelerate or delay revenue recognition, while cash flow reflects managerial 
decisions to increase or decrease working capital. Nonetheless, sales and cash flow would seem to be 
among the most exogenous of possible proxies for real economic performance. 
14We are concerned that, by sampling for low earnings firms, we have chosen firms whose accruals 
and cash flows are both unusually low. If so, cash flow is not a good indicator of exogenous 
performance, and the cash flow model could mechanically generate negative accrual prediction 
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from a time-series regression of accruals standardized by stockholders’ equity on 
a constant and contemporaneous standardized cash flow or sales. The regres- 
sions use the ten years (or nine or eight years, depending on availability) of 
accrual and sales or cash flow data for years immediately before year 0. The 
firm-specific coefficients generate accrual prediction errors based on actual 
accruals and cash flow or sales for years O-3. 
The table 4 accrual prediction errors indicate that sample firms have abnor- 
mally negative accruals in years 0 through 3 after controlling for exogenous 
poor performance. I5 For example, under the sales model, the year 0 mean 
accrual prediction error is - 0.084, the corresponding median is - 0.087, and 
68.4% of the observations are negative. The year 0 mean and median prediction 
errors are significantly negative at conventional levels (t-statistic = -2.24 
and Wilcoxon p-value < 0.01). Similar findings characterize years 1 through 3. 
Additionally, we find no evidence of materially higher accrual prediction 
errors for the binding sample relative to the nonbinding sample in years 
0 through 2 and only a hint of such a difference in year 3 (details not reported in 
the table). 
In sum, the prediction error analysis reinforces our earlier accrual findings: 
after controlling for sales or cash flows, the full sample exhibits statistically 
significant negative accrual prediction errors for years O-3, and there are no 
notable differences across firms with and without binding covenants. 
There are two (not mutually exclusive) interpretations for the finding that the 
combined sample of 76 troubled companies has negative abnormal accruals 
during the period they experience earnings problems. The first is that these 
accruals reflect managers’ ‘real’ (versus accounting) responses to financial 
trouble. Our section 4 analysis suggests that a portion of these accruals is indeed 
attributable to real decisions. The second is that the negative accruals reflect 
managers’ accounting choices. We explore this possibility in sections 5 and 6, 
and provide evidence that 87% of sample firms engage in contractual 
renegotiations - with lenders, unions, the government, and/or management 
- that provide incentives to reduce reported income. Overall, our analysis 
indicates that sample firms’ negative accruals reflect both real and accounting 
decisions. 
‘sBecause of concern over possible dependence in prediction errors, we also ran these tests 
employing an error components analysis of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression 
specifications. In these regressions, the dependent variable is standardized accruals and the indepen- 
dent variables are a constant, standardized sales (or cash flow, depending on the model), and 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one in years beginning with the dividend reduction year and 
zero otherwise. Both sales and cash flow models yield coefficients on the dummy variable that are 
negative and substantially more significant than those in table 4 i.e., both indicate unusually 
negative accruals (after controlling for sales or cash flow performance) beginning with the dividend 
reduction year. 
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4. Accounting choice in troubled companies A closer look 
In an earlier draft, we sought to identify the source of sample firms’ negative 
abnormal accruals by partitioning year 0 accruals into working capital and 
nonworking capital components. We found that the negative accruals are driven 
by two factors. The first is a large abnormal inventory decline that is significant 
under all statistical tests. This inventory decline probably largely reflects man- 
agers’ real responses to troubled firms’ economic circumstances rather than 
attempts to influence reported earnings.16 The second factor is the abnormal 
accrual that remains after we exclude all changes in working capital, deprecia- 
tion, and deferred taxes, which is significant under three of four tests. 
The latter finding suggests that the negative abnormal accruals in the divi- 
dend reduction year also reflect managers’ accounting choices. Specifically, they 
incorporate noncash writeoffs whose timing and/or magnitude are typically seen 
as discretionary.” To assess whether our sample’s year 0 writeoffs are plausibly 
viewed as discretionary, we inspect annual reports for all 76 sample firms after 
initially identifying writeoffs from Compustat Items 17 (special items) and 48 
(extraordinary items plus discontinued operations).‘* Following Elliott and 
Shaw (1988), we exclude as nondiscretionary all amounts from actual transac- 
tions. This approach is conservative since, e.g., it treats pension terminations 
and debt/equity swaps as not accounting-motivated, although prior studies 
argue otherwise [see Hand (1989), Hand, Hughes, and Sefcik (1990), Healy and 
Palepu (1990)]. 
Table 5 indicates that 40 (52.6%) of our 76 sample firms had noncash writeoffs 
(that did not result from a transaction) in the dividend reduction year. The 
timing of writedowns of productive assets (ten firms), investments (four firms), 
and restructuring costs (two firms) seems likely discretionary, since these charges 
are not related to a particular economic event.” Provisions for losses on 
‘61nventory reductions are likely economic responses to financial trouble, e.g., a decline in 
demand for the firm’s products. The average sample firm had a 6.5% sales decline in year 0 (median 
decline, 12.5%). Such a decline should be met with an initial exogenous build-up and subsequent 
endogenous reduction as managers adjust inventory for the new level of demand and to conserve 
cash. 
“See Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), ‘Accountants Debate Tightening Rules 
for ‘Big Bath’ Writeoffs by Companies’, The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 1986, ‘Big Bath? Or 
a Little One?, Forbes, October 6, 1986, ‘The Half a Hit Gambit’, Forbes, December 31, 1984, and 
‘Rumplestilzchen Accounting’, Forbes, February 24, 1986. The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board is currently considering tightening the accounting rules for impairment of long-lived assets 
because of the degree of managerial discretion they permit. 
“The year 0 mean values of Item 17 and Item 48 are -2.3% and -2.1% of pre-loss stock- 
holders’ equity, and both medians are zero. 
19Judgment is required to classify a given noncash writeoff as discretionary and, when in doubt, 
we took a conservative approach. [For example, we did not consider as discretionary Asarco’s $51.1 
million writeoff in the 1982 third quarter of its entire investment in Revere Copper and Brass, which 
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Table 5 
Nature of 40 discretionary noncash writeoffs in the year of initial dividend reduction for 
76 NYSE firms that reduced dividends in response to financial difficulties during 1980-1985. 
Discretionary noncash writeoffs are defined as those that do not result from an actual transaction, 
and are identified by inspection of annual report disclosures. Firms with more than one type of 
writeoff are classified based on the writeoff of the largest dollar magnitude, if disclosed, and 
otherwise on our judgment of the predominant type of writeoff. 
Nature of discretionary writeoff 
Provision for losses on plant, mine, or store closings 
Writedown of productive assets 
Provision for losses on operations to be sold 
Writedown of investment 
Provision for restructuring costs (various) 
Total writeoffs 
__ 







operations to be sold (five firms) require the expectation of an ultimate sale, but 
their timing seems largely discretionary since they can be reversed in future 
periods if a sale does not occur. The timing of the 19 provisions for losses on 
plant, mine, or store closings seems less clearly discretionary, since these earn- 
ings charges are linked to a visible event. 
Closer inspection reveals that the timing of these earnings charges bears no 
necessary relation to the actual plant or store closing, and is therefore likely 
discretionary. Specifically, closings generate earnings charges when manage- 
ment announces they are permanent, which can occur well before or after the 
actual closing. For example, less than a month before its December 1982 year 
end, Hanna Mining announced a $35 million charge for the permanent closure 
of a facility that had been idle since January 198 1. In contrast, three days before 
its December 1982 year end, Bethlehem Steel announced a $1 billion charge 
for plant closings that were anticipated by the end of the next fiscal year. In 
both cases, managers plausibly could defer the earnings charges into the next 
fiscal year by delaying announcement that the closure was expected to be 
permanent. 
had filed for Chapter 11. Asarco announced a plan to sell its stake to an investment banker on the 
last day of the 1982 fiscal year, so we considered this a transaction.] We also examined the full set of 
Compustat reported special items (Item 17) and extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Item 48). The means and medians are dampened relative to those for unusual items classified here as 
discretionary (probably because the full set includes unusual items from transactions that occur at 
a gain). There are no significant differences across the binding and control samples for the full set of 
Compustat-reported unusual items. 
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Table 6 
Magnitude and timing of 40 discretionary noncash writeoffs in the year of initial dividend reduction 
for 76 NYSE firms that reduced dividends in response to financial difficulties during 1980-1985. 
Discretionary noncash writeoffs are defined as those that do not result from an actual transaction, 
and are identified via inspection of annual report disclosures. 
(A) Magnitude of discretionary noncash writeoffs 





Writeoff as % of the absolute 
value of earnings 
Writeoff as % of pre-loss 
stockholders’ equity 
- 82.7 - 24.4 - 1,050.o to -0.7 
- 109.5 -28.8 - 1,469.6 to +83.8 
- 172.5% - 74.4% -2,800.O% to - 14.7% 
- 16.6% -9.9% -66.3% to -0.8% 
Quarter 
(B) Timing of discretionary noncash writeoffs 











Table 6 reveals that the year 0 noncash writeoffs are large, both in absolute 
terms and relative to earnings and to pre-loss stockholders’ equity.” The 
average writeoff is -$82.7 million (median, - $24.4 million), with a range of 
-$1.05 billion to -$0.7 million. The average writeoff comprises - 172.5% 
(median, -74.4%) of the year 0 absolute value of earnings, and is - 16.6% 
(median, - 9.9%) of pre-loss stockholders’ equity. 
For the 29 sample firms with binding debt covenants, the mean and median 
writeoff is sufficient to eliminate retained earnings available for dividends at the 
beginning of year 0. For these 29 firms, the median noncash writeoff totals 
- 134.1% of beginning-of-period URE (mean, -414.7%). For all 40 firms that 
took writeoffs in year 0, the median writeoff is - 54.5% of beginning-of-period 
URE (mean, -215.1%), which is a material fraction of earnings available for 
dividends. Writeoffs taken by firms whose covenants are already binding have 
?$ecial items (Item 17) are reported gross of tax, while extraordinary items plus discontinued 
operations (Item 48) are reported net of tax. To make the figures comparable, we added tax amounts 
to Item 48 amounts, so that all writeoff data in table 6 are pre-tax [as in Elliott and Shaw (1988)]. 
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no impact on the firm’s current ability to pay dividends but, since debt cove- 
nants are typically based on cumulative earnings, writeoffs dig a deeper ‘hole’ 
out of which the firm must climb before it can resume dividend payments.‘i 
Panel B of table 6 indicates that 82.5% of the noncash writeoffs are taken in 
the fourth fiscal quarter. [When writeoffs occur in multiple quarters, we assign 
all to the quarter with the largest dollar writeoff.] This incidence of fourth- 
quarter writeoffs is somewhat larger than the 62.9% reported by Elliott and 
Shaw (1988). Fourth-quarter writeoffs seem more likely to be discretionary since 
managers can better estimate annual earnings at that time (hence the adjustment 
needed to reach a given earnings target). They may also indicate the involvement 
of independent auditors in the financial reporting process. 
5. Monitoring explanations for income-decreasing accounting choices 
5.1. Monitoring by independent auditors 
If managers of troubled firms do deliberately decrease reported income, what 
circumstances provide the economic incentives to do so? One possibility is that 
these managers are forced to take earnings charges by auditors for whom 
a dividend reduction signals increased audit risk, and who respond with the 
threat of a qualified opinion. Of the 76 firms, 65 received clean audit opinions in 
the dividend reduction year, and only two (Republic Airlines and Western 
Union) received going-concern qualifications. It is, of course, possible that most 
firms received clean opinions because they complied with auditor-mandated 
writeoffs. On the other hand, auditors of large, well-established firms like Ford 
and Caterpillar unlikely perceive sufficiently great audit risk to force discretion- 
ary writeoffs before the firm generates a track record of losses.‘* While both 
arguments have merit, we cannot resolve the issue because we cannot observe 
the extent of auditor involvement in noncash writeoffs. 
5.2. Monitoring by lenders 
Another plausible explanation for noncash writeoffs is that troubled firms are 
subject to careful monitoring by private lenders. Once lenders are alerted to the 
prospect of financial difficulty because, e.g., a given client reports losses and/or 
reduces dividends, they perceive greater benefits from monitoring management 
*‘Noncash writeoffs were taken by 22 (46.8%) of the 47 firms that reduced dividends even though 
covenants were not binding. For these firms, writeoffs tighten covenants when financial troubles 
clearly put pressure on the dividend. 
2ZKellogg (1984, pp. 196197) reports that federal courts view the writeoffs we analyze (e.g., 
revisions of realizable values) as subjective, and are less likely to hold auditors liable for failing to 
force these writeoffs. 
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and will therefore more readily ‘see through’ accounting ploys designed to paint 
a rosier-than-warranted financial picture. Managers who attempt to evade their 
covenants or who otherwise reveal a failure to face up to the firm’s difficulties 
lose credibility with lenders, thereby endangering important financing sources at 
a critical time. In this view, managers of troubled firms have incentives to take 
discretionary writeoffs that signal to lenders their willingness to acknowledge 
and deal with the firm’s problems. 
Close monitoring by lenders seems virtually certain for the 29 firms 
with binding covenants. For the remaining 47 firms, the WSJ Index and annual 
reports indicate that 15 held negotiations with lenders by the end of the 
year after the dividend reduction. Thus, for 44 (57.9%) of the 76 sample firms, 
we find evidence that lenders were aware of the firm’s financial problems, and 
hence had enhanced incentives to more closely monitor its reported financial 
performance. 
We also find that private loan agreements are responsible for virtually all 
binding covenants in our sample. Table 7 reveals that about half the firms 
(44.8% with forced and 61.7% with voluntary dividend reductions) had public 
debt. However, it also indicates that public debt was the source of the covenant 
Table I 
Public versus private debt: Source of binding debt covenants for 76 NYSE firms that experienced 
protracted financial distress during 1980-1985. 
These debt classifications are based on information in company annual reports, Moody’s manuals, 
and the Wall Street Journal for the year of the firm’s initial dividend reduction. The figures in panel 
B refer to the source of binding covenants for the 29 firms whose initial dividend reductions were 
subject to binding constraints. 
Number of firms (% of subsample) 
Covenants binding Covenants not binding 
(A) Type of long-term debt 
Public and private debt 
Private debt only 
No long-term debt 
Total 
13 (44.8%) 29 (61.7%) 
15 (51.7%) 16 (34.0%) 
1 (3.5%) 2 (4.3%) 
29 (100.0%) 47 (100.0%) 













“Although this firm had no long-term debt outstanding, it was forced by creditors to reduce its 
dividend because it had guaranteed the debt issued by a former subsidiary it had just sold to 
subsidiary management. 
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violation for only two of the 29 firms with forced dividend reductionsz3 The 
finding that private debt agreements are responsible for almost all forced 
dividend cuts in our sample suggests that private lenders play a monitoring/ 
leadership role in troubled firms because, e.g., their financial expertise makes 
them relatively low-cost (efficient) monitors of managers. [For evidence of 
private lenders’ expertise, see Leftwich (1983) and El-Gazzar and Pastena 
(1990).] 
Our lender monitoring argument is consistent with agency theory insofar as it 
recognizes that accounting numbers help govern the relations between lenders 
and corporate borrowers. It differs from some variants of agency theory in its 
view that the scope of managerial discretion in troubled firms is deliberately 
limited by lenders seeking to protect their own interests. This argument suggests 
that, given firms in real economic difficulty, accounting-based debt constraints 
are strong enough that managers’ attempts to avoid them are unlikely to 
succeed systematically.24 
6. ‘Excuse’ explanations for our findings 
In this section, we consider a number of contractual renegotiations and/or 
stakeholder conflicts - manager-stockholder conflicts over the desirability of 
cash retention, management changes, union negotiations, and lobbying for 
government assistance - in which noncash writeoffs accompanied by a dividend 
reduction can help managers convince outside parties to make concessions that 
will help the firm effect a quicker recovery from its financial difficulties. The 
timing of the dividend reduction announcement relative to the writeoff quarter 
suggests that managers take noncash writeoffs to justify ex post a prior shift in 
dividend policy. Of the 40 firms with noncash writeoffs, 32 took the writeoffs in 
quarters that followed the dividend reduction announcement. This timing pat- 
tern runs counter to the tendency [documented, e.g., by Lintner (1956) and 
Fama and Babiak (1968)] for dividend policy adjustments to lag earnings 
changes. 
‘sWe also examined the ten firms that had subsequent dividend reductions forced by 
binding covenants, and found no case in which public debt was the source of the binding con- 
straint. 
“‘This view may also explain the difference between our findings and those in Frost and 
Bernard (1989). We find a material number of covenant-forced dividend cuts for firms with persistent 
losses, whereas Frost and Bernard find no evidence of economic consequences to technical 
covenant violations caused by SEC-mandated writeoffs. If sophisticated lenders can distinguish 
real financial deterioration from technical violations due to accounting standard changes, 
material economic consequences should follow the former, but not the latter covenant 
violations. 
136 H. DeAngelo et al., Accounting choice in :roubled companies 
6.1. Manager-stockholder conflicts over cash retention 
One possibility is that managers (and perhaps lenders) believe a dividend cut 
is prudent given the likely persistence of earnings problems, yet are unable to 
convince outside stockholders who suspect managers of expropriating ‘free cash 
flow’ [Jensen (1986)]. Reporting lower earnings can help justify a payout 
reduction to outside stockholders. To ascertain how often management ex- 
plained the dividend reduction as necessitated by low earnings, we inspect 
management’s letter to stockholders in the year 0 annual report. In 16 cases, 
managers explicitly link dividend reductions to poor earnings. In another six 
cases, managers implicitly make this connection by stating that future dividends 
will be increased when profitability warrants it. Thus, in 22 cases, there is some 
indication that managers use poor earnings to rationalize the dividend reduction. 
The dividend reduction, however, is typically not the central focus of the 
stockholder letter. Instead, managers overwhelmingly focus on the general 
financial difficulties the firm faces, and especially on factors beyond managers’ 
control that generated or exacerbated those difficulties. The time and industry 
clustering exhibited by our sample facilitates this behavior - managers can more 
readily rationalize losses and dividend reductions when the economy is in 
a general recession and entire industries are experiencing financial trouble. 
4.2. Management changes 
Managers’ tendency to link poor performance to economy- or industry-wide 
factors is perhaps not surprising, given that sample firms (and troubled firms in 
general) exhibit a high incidence of managerial turnover. To assess turnover in 
our firms, we inspected the WSJ Index for the year of and the year after the 
dividend reduction and the annual report for the dividend reduction year. We 
find evidence of changes in the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and/or 
President positions at 35 of the 76 (46.1%) sample firms. This high turnover rate 
is consistent with Gilson’s (1989) evidence of relatively high managerial turnover 
at firms experiencing financial trouble.2s 
In Gilson’s (1989) study, managerial departures were most often forced by the 
board (with pressure from lenders a close second). Thus the writeoffs we observe 
might be in part attributable to monitoring of management’s policies by the 
board, which forces management to acknowledge the firm’s problems. Such 
ZsO~r numbers translate to an annual turnover rate of about 23%. For financially troubled firms, 
Gilson reports turnover rates for Chairmen, CEOs, and Presidents of(i) 52% per year when firms 
are in default, bankrupt, or restructuring debt and (ii) 19% per year in years of trouble, but without 
public evidence of creditor negotiations. For firms that are not experiencing financial difficulties, 
turnover rates for these positions are about 11.5% per year, according to Warner, Watts, and Wruck 
(1988). 
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acknowledgment can help accomplish a restructuring by, e.g., encouraging 
employees to cooperate in streamlining operations. Alternatively, these writeoffs 
might represent an earnings ‘bath’ taken by new managers [Moore (1973) 
DeAngelo (1988), Pourciau (1993)]. However, only 17 of the 35 management 
changes in our sample occurred before the fiscal year end of the dividend 
reduction year (another four occurred within the next three months). Writeoffs 
taken by the other 14 firms cannot be explained as post-management change 
earnings ‘baths’. 
The high managerial turnover in our sample suggests that writeoffs in the 
dividend reduction year are implausibly viewed as managers’ attempts to 
increase future bonuses. Rational managers would not likely assign much 
importance to next year’s bonus, given the likelihood of job loss (especially since 
being caught attempting to manipulate bonuses would further threaten their 
tenure). Consistent with this view, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) report that 
firms in default typically reduce reliance on accounting-based compensation plans 
and the majority do not pay a bonus [see also DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991)]. 
Thus, managers of troubled firms more likely take earnings charges to acknow- 
ledge the severity of the firm’s problems - i.e., to convince the board and lenders 
that managers recognize these problems and intend to deal with them head-on. 
6.3. Union negotiations 
Open acknowledgment of the seriousness of the firm’s troubles can improve 
the firm’s bargaining position with organized labor. For example, losses and 
dividend reductions help managers portray the firm as seriously troubled, hence 
to extract concessions from unionized workers who otherwise would doubt the 
extent and likely persistence of the firm’s difficulties [Liberty and Zimmerman 
(1986) DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991)]. 26 Managers of troubled firms have 
incentives to pursue these concessions to the extent they believe that obtaining 
them strengthens their chances of retaining their own jobs in an economic 
downturn. 
For 29 (38.2%) sample firms, we find reports of union negotiations or strikes 
in the WSJ Index for the year of or after the dividend reduction, and/or in the 
firm’s annual report for the dividend reduction year.27 These reports reveal that 
“Reported earnings are likely to have a greater influence on the rank and file than on the union 
leadership who are in a better position to detect earnings management. In some scenarios (e.g., the 
recession circumstances we study), union leaders may truly believe that the firm is sufficiently 
troubled that concessions are in order. If so, income-decreasing accounting choices and dividend 
reductions likely help union leaders convince the rank and file to support a concessionary labor 
agreement they have negotiated with management. 
“As reported in table 8 below, the 38.2% incidence of union negotiations is unusually high for 
our sample, relative to their incidence three and six years prior (negotiations are typically held every 
three years). 
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requests for labor ‘givebacks’ are sometimes explicitly connected to wage freezes 
or rollbacks for management and dividend cuts for stockholders. Liberty and 
Zimmerman (1986) find no evidence of income-decreasing accounting choices 
during labor negotiations. One possible explanation for the difference between 
our findings and theirs is that managers can improve their bargaining position 
through income-decreasing accounting choices only when there is confirmatory 
evidence of serious financial trouble and of sacrifices by other stakeholders. 
Otherwise workers will attribute low earnings to managers’ attempts to extract 
union concessions (while preserving their own and stockholders’ cash payouts). 
Another factor that may help explain the difference between our findings and 
those of Liberty and Zimmerman is that they study routine union negotiations 
that occur every three years, whereas our sample is limited to negotiations that 
occurred during a major economic recession. Managers’ ability to deliberately 
understate reported income during routine negotiations is limited by the union’s 
ability to learn about the extent of managerial discretion over time. In contrast, 
a severe recession can lead to requests for union ‘givebacks’ because of demon- 
strably serious general economic conditions. Writeoffs and restructuring 
charges may thus be more readily justified to the rank and file who are already 
suffering the consequences of large-scale layoffs and plant closings. 
6.4. Government lobbying 
Losses and dividend reductions can also be used to support managers’ case 
for government aid, e.g., import relief [as in Jones (1991)] or other concessions, 
such as a government bailout or antitrust relief. We find evidence of this 
motivation in 11 cases, based on inspection of the WSJ Index and annual 
reports. In most cases, managers used their firm’s financial troubles to argue for 
steel or automobile import relief, but there are also attempts to obtain antitrust 
clearance for an airline merger and to protest deregulation of interstate trucking. 
Our general impression is that managers did not simply manipulate accounting 
choices and dividend policy to create a case for government aid - rather, they 
used losses and dividend reductions to buttress other evidence of financial 
trouble. 
6.5. Overall assessment 
Table 8 summarizes the frequency with which sample firms held negotiations 
with labor unions, lenders, had a management change, or engaged in govern- 
ment lobbying for economic relief in the year of or after the dividend reduction 
(years 0 and 1). For comparison purposes, we investigate the frequency with 
which sample firms had these events both three and six years before the dividend 
reduction (where ‘three years prior’ includes events for years - 3 and - 2 and 
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Table 8 
Lender and union negotiations, management changes, and political lobbying around dividend 
reductions and in prior years for 76 NYSE firms that had multiple losses and reduced dividends 
during 1980-1985. 
Category 1 contains the 29 firms whose debt covenants were binding in the dividend reduction year, 
plus the 15 firms with nonbinding covenants that held negotiations with lenders according to the 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Category 2 contains firms for which the WSJ reveals discussions with 
unions and/or strikes. Category 3 contains firms for which the WSJ mentions changes in Chairman, 
CEO, and/or President positions. Category 4 contains firms for which the WSJ discusses attempts to 
influence government agencies (e.g., to constrain imports because of threats posed to domestic firms’ 
survival). Here the dividend reduction year includes events reported in years 0 and 1, ‘three 
years prior’ includes events for years - 3 and - 2, and ‘six years prior’ includes events for years - 6 
and -5. 
Number of cases (% of sample) and p-value for chi-square 
comparison test between incidence in specified year and incidence 
in dividend reduction year 


















Firms with at least one 
of the above events 
44 (57.9%) 3 (3.9%) 1 (1.3%) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
29 (38.2%) 19 (25.0%) 21 (27.6%) 
p = 0.01 p = 0.04 
35 (46.1%) 20 (26.3%) 16 (21.1%) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
11 (14.5%) 8 (10.5%) 6 (7.9%) 
p = 0.26 p = 0.03 
66 (86.8%) 34 (44.7%) 35 (46.0%) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
‘six years prior’ includes events for years - 6 and - 5). We chose three and six 
years prior as the benchmark for ‘normal’ negotiation activity for our sample 
firms because union negotiations typically occur at three-year intervals. 
Table 8 indicates an unusually high incidence of lender and union negoti- 
ations, management changes, and political lobbying by our sample firms around 
the time they reduced dividends. The year 0 incidence ranges from 14.5% for 
political lobbying to 57.9% for negotiations with lenders. Overall, a total of 66 
sample firms (about 87%) engaged in renegotiations (of explicit or implicit 
contracts) that engender managerial incentives to reduce reported earnings. The 
87% incidence compares to a 44.7% incidence of at least one type of contractual 
renegotiation three years prior and a 46.0% incidence six years prior. All 
renegotiation categories in the table exhibit a reliably higher incidence around 
the dividend reduction under chi-square tests, except for political lobbying 
(relative to its incidence three years, but not six years prior). 
140 H. DeAngelo et al., Accounting choice in troubled companies 
Interestingly, lender renegotiations occur about 15 to 45 times more often 
when dividends are reduced than in ‘normal’ periods. This finding provides 
additional support for the lender monitoring argument. Union negotiations are 
also more prevalent, perhaps because some union negotiations are accelerated 
due to sample firm’s demonstrable financial difficulties [this is the case for the 
steel industry, as detailed in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991)]. Management 
changes occur around dividend reductions about twice as often as they do in 
‘normal’ times, and the normal incidence of management turnover in our sample 
(10.6% to 13.2% per year) is close to the 11.5% reported in Warner, Watts, and 
Wruck (1988). Overall, the unusual incidence of contractual renegotiations 
around dividend reductions provides additional support for our interpretation 
that the negative accruals of troubled firms in part reflect managers’ accounting 
discretion. 
The table 8 data reveal that the average firm with at least one event - lender or 
union negotiations, a management change, political lobbying - has 1.8 such 
events. This finding points out the difficulty of attributing the negative accruals 
of troubled firms to any one event, e.g., a management change, without control- 
ling for the propensity of troubled firms to engage in multiple contractual 
renegotiations. Our findings suggest two caveats for studies of accounting 
choice in samples that contain firms with earnings problems. First, our firms’ 
large negative accruals are accompanied by deterioration in operating cash flow, 
so that controlling for exogenous poor performance is potentially important in 
assessing the extent to which troubled firms’ accruals reflect accounting choices. 
Second, our firms renegotiated a variety of explicit and implicit contracts, 
making it difficult to attribute evidence of earnings management to any one 
contractual renegotiation (versus the overall process). 
7. Summary 
This paper finds that the accounting choices made by managers of 76 troubled 
firms primarily reflect recognition of their firms’ financial difficulties, rather than 
systematic attempts to inflate earnings to avoid debt covenant violations or to 
otherwise portray the firm as less troubled. We study earnings, cash flow, 
accruals, and noncash writeoffs in 76 NYSE firms with persistent losses during 
1980-1985 that reduced cash dividends, about 40% of which had binding debt 
covenants at the time. In years before the dividend reduction, firms with binding 
covenants are predicted to have higher accruals than firms without binding 
covenants, since managers of the former firms have stronger incentives to 
increase earnings to mitigate covenant violations. In the ten years before the 
dividend cut, we find only minor accrual differences across the two samples, 
although the power of our tests is low because of an inability to predict the exact 
timing of any such earnings management. 
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We observe large negative accruals in the dividend reduction and subsequent 
three years, both for the full sample and for firms with and without binding 
covenants. Unlike earnings, mean and median operating cash flows remain 
positive throughout this period, although their level is about half what it was in 
the ten prior years. After controlling for sample firms’ cash flow and sales 
performance, we continue to observe large negative accruals in the dividend 
reduction and subsequent years. A substantial portion of the negative accruals 
in the dividend reduction year is due to an abnormal inventory decline, which is 
more plausibly viewed as the result of managers’ ‘real’ choices rather than as 
earnings management. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that sample 
firms’ large negative accruals persist for several years following the dividend 
reduction, suggesting that it is financial trouble per se, and not dividend 
reductions or covenant violations, that underlies the negative accruals. 
While the data suggest that the negative accruals of firms with persistent 
losses and dividend reductions are due in part to managers’ real economic 
decisions, we also find evidence of income-decreasing accounting choices. Spe- 
cifically, in the dividend reduction year 40 of the 76 firms take noncash writeoffs 
whose timing is reasonably viewed as discretionary to managers. These writeoffs 
are substantial: the median writeoff is approximately one half of beginning- 
of-period unrestricted retained earnings, and the mean has even greater impact. 
Strikingly, both the mean and median writeoffs for firms with binding debt 
covenants are sufficiently large by themselves to eliminate unrestricted retained 
earnings available for dividend payments. While our findings on noncash 
writeoffs suggest that managers of troubled firms deliberately reduce reported 
earnings, it is a priori unclear what economic incentives they have to do so. 
Closer inspection indicates that 87% of sample firms renegotiate contracts 
with lenders or labor unions, have management changes, and/or lobby for 
government assistance, all of which plausibly motivate managers to reduce 
reported earnings. We also find that private debt restrictions are responsible for 
almost all forced dividend reductions in our sample, even though most firms had 
public debt as well. This finding suggests that noncash writeoffs provide lenders 
with a credible signal that managers recognize and intend to deal with the firm’s 
financial problems. Reduced earnings and dividends can also help managers 
convince parties other than lenders (e.g., unionized labor or government 
authorities) that the firm is truly troubled and deserves wage concessions and/or 
government assistance. Overall, sample firms’ large and persistently negative 
accruals apparently reflect (i) their generally troubled circumstances which lead 
to changes in ‘real’ decisions such as inventory adjustments that reduce accruals, 
and (ii) earnings management associated with the variety of contractual re- 
negotiations engendered by financial trouble. 
A final caveat is in order: although our analysis indicates that sample firms 
exhibit large negative accruals during their financial difficulties, one must be 
cautious about extrapolating this finding to the full population of troubled 
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companies. The reason is that we sampled for firms with reported losses. It 
seems reasonable to expect that unusually low accrual realizations will tend to 
map into low earnings realizations, which makes it more likely that a given firm 
with low accruals will enter our sample. This selection bias implies that our 
sample firms’ negative accruals represent a downward-biased estimate of the 
accruals that would characterize a broader population of troubled firms (not 
limited to companies with persistent earnings problems that reduce cash divi- 
dends to stockholders). 
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